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I. INTRODUCTION
In the fall of 2001, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued a 
seemingly unimportant decision in the case of State v. Greer.1  The 
case involved Ronald Lewis Greer’s appeal from convictions for 
first- and second-degree murder in the shooting death of Kareem 
Brown.2 At first glance, the case seems insignificant because the 
court disposed of three of Greer’s bases for appeal in a very 
straightforward manner,3 and merely remanded the fourth issue to 
the district court for the creation of a more complete record by 
conducting a Schwartz hearing.4  However, a historical analysis of 
the use of the Schwartz hearing reveals that Greer was a much more 
significant case.
The facts of the case are as follows.  Kareem Brown was shot to 
death in south Minneapolis shortly after midnight on July 26, 
       † Kelly Lyn Mitchell is a staff attorney for the Court Services Division, State 
Court Administrator’s Office, Supreme Court of Minnesota.
1. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82 (Minn. 2001).
2. Id. at 84.
3. Id. at 85.
4. Id.  A Schwartz hearing is a procedure for determining whether an outside 
influence has had a prejudicial effect on the jury. See Schwartz v. Minneapolis 
Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960). See also discussion infra
Part II.A.1.
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1998.5  One witness at the scene said two men were arguing in the 
middle of the street, and then one of the men shot the other with a 
semi-automatic handgun and ran away through a vacant lot.6
Another witness said he heard gunshots, and then saw a man 
dispose of a gun in a trash can in the alley below his window.7  Still
another witness stated he saw a man he knew as Ronald Lewis 
Greer walking toward the scene of the shooting with a gun, and 
that he later heard gunshots and the sound of someone opening a 
trash can lid and throwing an object into it.8  Based upon this 
information, the police attempted to locate Greer, and were
subsequently notified that he was in custody in Detroit, Michigan.9
The police interrogated Greer, both in Detroit and Minneapolis, 
and received several conflicting statements from him.10  Greer was 
subsequently tried for the death of Kareem Brown and convicted of 
first- and second-degree murder.11
On appeal,12 Greer raised four issues: (1) whether the trial 
court deprived him of the right to an impartial jury by limiting voir 
dire examination of six prospective jurors regarding their attitudes 
toward police officers; (2) whether he was denied due process and 
the right to confront witnesses against him when the trial court 
refused to permit him to impeach a witness for the prosecution 
with evidence of a prior conviction; (3) whether his right to present 
a meaningful defense was violated when the trial court refused to 
permit him to testify as to the circumstances surrounding his 
statements to the police; and (4) whether he was entitled to a 
Schwartz hearing to determine the nature and effect of the trial 
court’s ex parte contacts with the jury during trial.13  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court found that Greer’s arguments as to the first three 




9. Id. at 86.
10. Id. at 86-87.  Greer first told the officers he was present at the scene of the 
shooting, but that another individual, referred to as “E,” shot Brown. Id. at 86.  At 
trial, Greer testified that he told the police that he was at a friend’s home at the 
time of the killing and had placed himself at the scene only so Minneapolis 
officers would get him out of the Detroit jail, which he described as a “filthy rat-
and roach-infested cell.” Id. at 86-87.
11. Id. at 84.
12. In Minnesota, a person who has been convicted of first-degree murder
may appeal as of right directly to the supreme court. MINN. STAT. § 632.14 (2000); 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 29.02, subd. 1.
13. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 84-85.
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issues were without merit, but that it lacked a sufficient record to 
determine the fourth issue.14  Therefore, the case was remanded to 
the Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial District of Minnesota for 
further proceedings.15
The fourth issue—whether Greer was entitled to a Schwartz
hearing to determine the nature and effect of the trial judge’s 
alleged ex parte contacts with the jury—is the focus of this article.
This issue presented the supreme court with an unusual set of 
circumstances in which the trial judge’s rulings regarding his own
conduct were central to the controversy.  Yet through subtle 
language, the court managed to utilize these unique circumstances 
to express positive shifts in policy that will ensure the defendant’s
right to both an impartial jury and an impartial judge. First, the 
court clarified that Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03,
subdivision 9 applies to allegations of misconduct discovered prior
to jury deliberations, while Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure
26.03, subdivision 19(6) applies to allegations of misconduct
discovered after the jury has entered deliberations or after the 
verdict has been rendered, though both procedures may result in 
what has come to be known as a Schwartz hearing.16  Second, the 
case marked the first time that the supreme court clearly
established that when there is a question as to the effect of the trial 
judge’s own conduct on the verdict, and a Schwartz hearing is held, 
it should be conducted by a different judge so there can be no 
question as to the impartiality of the court’s decision.17
II. THE TRIAL COURT’S EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH THE JURY
The procedural history of Greer’s fourth basis for appeal is 
convoluted, overlapping, and downright confusing.  Following his 
conviction, Greer filed a motion for a new trial alleging that the 
trial judge had improper ex parte contacts with the jury.18  During 
voir dire, the judge admitted that he was usually the one to tell 
jurors when it was time to break for lunch.19  And, according to 
affidavits filed by Greer’s attorneys with the motion for a new trial, 
14. Id. at 85.
15. Id.
16. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 93. See also infra Part II.A.
17. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 93-94. See also infra Part II.B.
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the attorneys saw the trial judge enter the jury room numerous 
times during the trial.20  Moreover, during sentencing, Greer’s 
counsel and the trial court judge had the following exchange:
MS. DIEPERINK: Your Honor, I just want to say for the 
record that you did go into the jury room and close the 
door.  The door was closed and we don’t know what those 
conversations were, and we’re not waiving any of our 
rights to any of our appeal issues because you’re cutting us 
off here.
THE COURT: I did not go in the jury room and close the 
door.  The door was always left open.21
Contemporaneously with the motion for a new trial filed with 
the trial judge, Greer filed a motion for a new trial with the Chief 
Judge of the Fourth Judicial District requesting that the trial judge 
recuse himself on the issue of contact with the jurors.  Greer also 
requested that the Chief Judge preside over a Schwartz hearing on 
that issue.22  The Chief Judge denied the motion, stating, “the 
Motion for New Trial shall be heard and determined by the [trial 
court] unless and until he recuses himself or is otherwise removed 
for cause from presiding in the case.”23  Three days after the order 
was issued, Greer brought a motion to disqualify or remove the trial 
court judge.24  Greer argued that the trial court judge should 
recuse himself from the issue of contacts with the jurors because he 
had “personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts” and “his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”25  Therefore, Greer 
requested that the Chief Judge remove the trial court judge for 
cause from the pending proceedings.  Greer also requested that 
the Chief Judge personally preside over the Schwartz hearing and 
the accompanying motion for a new trial.26  The motion was 
20. Id. at app. 5-6.
21. Id. at 35 n.61 (citing sentencing transcript).
22. Id. at app. 7.
23. Id. at app. 11 (Order, Chief Judge Daniel Mabley, June 4, 1999).
24. Id. at app. 12-13 (Notice of Motion and Motion to Disqualify or Remove, 
June 7, 1999).
25. Id. at app. 15 (Memorandum of Law, citing MINN. CODE JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(D)).
26. Id. at app. 17 (Memorandum of Law).
4
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denied.27  That same day, the trial court judge summarily denied
Greer’s motions to recuse and to grant a new trial.28
In deciding whether Greer was erroneously deprived of a 
Schwartz hearing, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed two 
critical issues: (1) the procedure to be followed in alerting the trial 
court to the possibility of outside impact on the jury’s verdict;29 and 
(2) the propriety of a trial court judge presiding over a hearing to 
determine the nature and effect of his own conduct.30  This section 
will examine each issue in turn.
A. A Question of Procedure
In analyzing Greer’s entitlement to a Schwartz hearing, the 
supreme court first addressed the procedure that Greer should 
have followed in bringing the alleged misconduct to light.  Initially, 
the court stated: “If a defendant learns, either during deliberations
or after the verdict is reached, that a court official has had ex parte
contacts with the jury, the defendant should move for a Schwartz
hearing pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6).”31
However, the court then differentiated the procedure that should 
be used during trial by stating: “If, on the other hand, a defendant 
becomes aware of such exposure during the trial proceeding itself, then 
the proper course of action is to bring the matter to the attention 
of the trial court at once in the form of a motion for a hearing 
under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.03, subd. 9.”32  This differentiation 
misconstrues the origin and interpretation of the cited Criminal 
Rules of Procedure and, if subsequently followed, represents a shift 
in application.
1. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 
19(6) (Schwartz Hearing)
The Schwartz hearing is a procedure that was established by the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in 1960 in Schwartz v. Minneapolis
Suburban Bus Co.33  In Schwartz, which involved an accident between 
27. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001).
28. Brief for Appellant at app. 18 (Order Denying Defense Motion for a New 
Trial, Judge Harry Crump, June 16, 1999).
29. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 93.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. 258 Minn. 325, 104 N.W.2d 301 (1960).
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an automobile and a bus, one juror allegedly answered in voir dire 
that he could be fair and impartial and that neither he nor any 
member of his family had ever been in an accident.34  However, 
after the trial an investigator for the defendant interviewed the
juror and learned that his daughter had been injured in an
accident a short distance from where the accident at issue in the 
trial had occurred.35  As a result of the interview, the defendant 
produced a sworn statement from the juror stating that he had 
thought about his daughter’s accident frequently during the trial 
and that it may have influenced his decision.36  Based on this 
statement, the defendant bus company made a motion for a new 
trial, which was subsequently denied by the trial court.37
In considering the case on appeal, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court expressed concern about what had apparently become a 
common practice of parties questioning jurors about their
deliberations.  The court stated, “we are of the opinion that it is 
undesirable to permit attorneys or investigators for a defeated 
litigant to harass jurors by submitting them to interrogation of this 
kind without more protection for the ascertainment of the facts 
than appears in this case.”38  In response to that concern, the court 
set forth a procedure that would come to be known as the Schwartz
hearing, stating:
Cases may and do arise where a juror’s untruthful
answering of questions propounded upon a voir dire
examination will prevent a litigant from having a fair trial. 
Where such cases arise, and the facts come to light after 
the rendition of a verdict, some method of obtaining 
relief obviously should be available.  However, rather than 
permit or encourage the promiscuous interrogation of 
jurors by the defeated litigant, we think that the better
practice would be to bring the matter to the attention of 
the trial court, and, if it appears that the facts justify so 
doing, the trial court may then summon the juror before 
him and permit an examination in the presence of
counsel for all interested parties and the trial judge under 
34. Id. at 327, 104 N.W.2d at 302-03.  However, it should be noted that one 
attorney in the case filed a counter affidavit stating that the question regarding 
involvement in an accident by the juror or a member of his family was never asked.
Id. at 327, 104 N.W.2d at 303.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 326, 104 N.W.2d at 302.
38. Id. at 328, 104 N.W.2d at 303.
6
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proper safeguards . . . .  A record then could be made 
which could be presented to this court if any doubt
existed about the correctness of the trial court’s ruling 
after such hearing.39
Thus, the initial procedure described in Schwartz seemed to be 
limited to post-trial situations in which a juror provided untruthful 
or misleading answers on voir dire. Additionally, because the
procedure was developed in the context of a civil case, there was 
some question as to its applicability to criminal cases.
Initially, cases interpreting or applying this procedure were 
limited to the narrow circumstances present in Schwartz.40  But it 
was not long before the supreme court indicated in its opinions 
that the Schwartz hearing could be used for a broader category of 
conduct including improper conduct by a juror outside the jury 
room during deliberations,41 juror bias resulting in an excessive 
verdict,42 alleged misconduct by a bailiff,43 or alleged prejudicial 
misconduct by a spectator.44  On several occasions, however, the 
court reiterated that the true purpose of the hearing was to 
discontinue the once accepted practice of parties questioning 
jurors to discover possible bases for impeachment of the verdict.45
In Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co.,46 the court reiterated its 
explanation of the post-verdict procedure set forth in Schwartz and 
then further explained: (1) the Schwartz hearing should be
requested by the verdict loser when the first suspicion of
misconduct arises; (2) the court should be liberal in granting a 
Schwartz hearing, even in the case of oral assertions of misconduct 
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., State v. Hayden Miller Co., 263 Minn. 29, 116 N.W.2d 535 (1962); 
Atkinson v. Mock, 271 Minn. 393, 135 N.W.2d 892 (1965).
41. See Weber v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 274 Minn. 482, 144 N.W.2d 540 
(1966).
42. See Patterson v. Donahue, 291 Minn. 285, 190 N.W.2d 864 (1971).
43. See Fick v. Wolfinger, 293 Minn. 483, 198 N.W.2d 146 (1972).
44. See Goblirsch v. W. Land Roller Co., 310 Minn. 471, 475, 246 N.W.2d 687, 
690 (1976) (“We have approved the use of such hearings under the supervision of 
the trial judge, and had a clear and timely request been made, it would not have 
been inappropriate to conduct such a hearing in this case.”).
45. See, e.g., Patterson, 291 Minn. at 289, 190 N.W.2d at 867 (1966) (“The
remote possibility that misconduct requiring reversal may be undetected is more 
than offset by the importance of shielding jurors from harassment.”); Olberg v. 
Minneapolis Gas Co., 291 Minn. 334, 344, 191 N.W.2d 418, 425 (1971) (“Attorneys
should not be allowed to contact and harass jurors who render verdicts of a 
nonsuspicious nature.”).
46. 291 Minn. 334, 191 N.W.2d 418 (1971).
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or hearsay affidavits; and (3) neither the defeated party’s counsel 
nor investigator should ever contact a juror to gather evidence for a 
Schwartz hearing.47  The court felt so strongly about its desire to end 
juror harassment, that it closed the Olberg opinion by stating, “[i]t is 
hoped that this explanation of the Schwartz hearing will end the 
practice of attorneys contacting jurors in hopes of impeaching the 
verdict.”48
Six years later, however, juror harassment had not ended.  In 
Baker v. Gile,49 the Minnesota Supreme Court refused to consider 
the issue of juror misconduct altogether because the attorney in 
that case obtained information about the alleged misconduct by 
contacting three jurors directly.50 Additionally, the court
encouraged trial courts to deny petitions for Schwartz hearings 
when based upon information that was improperly obtained.51  In 
taking this stand, the court firmly established the Schwartz hearing
in civil practice.
Two years prior, the procedure was integrated into criminal 
practice when the Minnesota Supreme Court promulgated the 
Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 which incorporated the Schwartz
hearing as Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03,
subdivision 19(6).53  At the time of its inception in July of 1975, the 
rule read substantially as it does today:
(6) Impeachment of the Verdict. Affidavits of jurors shall not 
be received in evidence to impeach their verdict.  If the 
defendant has reason to believe that the verdict is subject 
to impeachment, he shall move the court for a summary 
hearing.  If the motion is granted the jurors shall be 
interrogated under oath and their testimony recorded.54
47. Id. at 343-44, 191 N.W.2d at 424-25.
48. Id. at 344, 191 N.W.2d at 425.
49. 257 N.W.2d 376 (Minn. 1977).
50. Id. at 378.
51. Id.
52. The authority of the Minnesota Supreme Court to promulgate rules in 
criminal proceedings was recognized by the state legislature in 1971.  1971 Minn. 
Laws ch. 250, §§ 1-8 (now codified at MINN. STAT. § 480.059 (2000)).
53. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6) cmt. (adopting the procedure set 
out in Schwartz v. Minneapolis Suburban Bus Co., 258 Minn. 325, 327, 104 N.W.2d 
301, 303 (1960)).
54. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6) (effective July 1, 1975).  Since its 
original promulgation, the Rule has been amended only twice: once to add a 
reference to MINN. R. EVID. 606(b) regarding what a juror may testify to in the 
Schwartz hearing, MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6) (effective August 1, 1983), 
and once to update the language so that it would be gender neutral. MINN. R. 
8
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As in the civil context, initial applications in the criminal arena 
centered on post-trial discovery of misconduct.55 But contrary to the 
suggestion in Greer,56 in both civil and criminal proceedings, use of 
the Schwartz procedure has not remained limited to post-trial
discovery of misconduct.  In Quinn v. Winkel’s, Inc.,57 the court 
indicated that a Schwartz hearing might be appropriate to uncover 
the possibility of jury tampering.58
In the criminal context, pre-verdict issues have arisen more 
frequently.  In State v. McRae,59 a juror notified the judge that a man 
in the hall outside the courtroom had said, in effect, “You better 
vote guilty or we’ll kill you.”60  The trial court immediately held a 
Schwartz hearing to determine whether the communication affected 
the jury’s ability to render a fair and impartial verdict.61  The trial 
court found no evidence of prejudice, and the court of appeals 
upheld this finding.62  In State v. Durfee,63 the defendant learned that 
a juror talked about the case outside of the trial but the defendant 
concealed his knowledge of the conversation until after the verdict 
was rendered.64 Citing Schwartz, the court stated that the
information should have been brought to the trial court’s attention 
immediately, which would have necessitated a Schwartz hearing
CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6) (effective January 1, 1990).
55. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484-85 (Minn. 1979) (holding 
that the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying defendant’s motion 
for a Schwartz hearing because a juror’s statements to the press following the 
verdict that “the mental illness defense is just an easy way out” did not reveal jury 
misconduct in light of the verdict acquitting the defendant by reason of mental 
illness); State v. Domabyl, 272 N.W.2d 745, 746-47 (Minn. 1978) (upholding trial 
court’s denial of a Schwartz hearing because defense sought to question jurors 
about possible misunderstanding of the instructions, which is outside the scope of 
issues to which a juror may testify); State v. Kyles, 257 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 
1977) (finding defense counsel should have requested a Schwartz hearing when 
they learned of juror’s affiliation with the insurance company that paid the claim 
for items taken during the burglary defendant was alleged to have committed).
56. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001).
57. 279 N.W.2d 65 (Minn. 1979).
58. Id. at 69 (upholding the trial court’s decision not to conduct a full 
Schwartz hearing in response to allegations of jury tampering after the trial court 
questioned the jurors as a group, and on the record, as to whether anyone had 
attempted to contact them about the trial).
59. 371 N.W.2d 66 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
60. Id. at 67.
61. Id. at 67-68.
62. Id. at 68.
63. 322 N.W.2d 778 (Minn. 1982).
64. Id. at 786.
9
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prior to the jury entering into deliberations.65  And in Boitnott v. 
State,66 the supreme court upheld the use of a Schwartz hearing to 
determine whether a juror could remain on the panel after she 
informed the trial court that her sister was attending the trial and 
apparently knew some of the witnesses.67
Applying the Schwartz procedure to pre-verdict discovery of 
misconduct makes sense in light of the supreme court’s original 
directive in Olberg that a Schwartz hearing should be requested 
“when the first suspicion of misconduct arises.”68  However, the 
more recent supreme court decisions have referred to the Schwartz
procedure only in the context of post-trial issues.  In State v. Shoen,69
the court noted, “its applicability has expanded to address other 
post-trial issues involving juries.”70  And in Greer, the court held that 
the hearing codified in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 
26.03, subdivision 19(6) should be used if the defendant learns of 
misconduct during deliberations or after the verdict is reached, but 
that Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9 
should be used if the defendant becomes aware of the misconduct 
during the trial itself.71  Thus, in order to determine whether this 
distinction is correct, one must also examine the origin of
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9.
2. Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9
Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9 was 
promulgated as one of the original Rules of Criminal Procedure 
that went into effect on July 1, 1975.  Here again, the Rule read 
substantially the same as it does today:
Subd. 9.  Questioning Jurors About Exposure to
Potentially Prejudicial Material in the Course of a Trial.  If 
it is determined that material disseminated outside the 
65. Id. at 786 n.8.
66. 631 N.W.2d 362 (Minn. 2001).
67. Id. at 368, 371-72.
68. Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 291 Minn. 334, 343, 191 N.W.2d 418, 424 
(1971).  Granted, this directive was given in the context of the “verdict loser;” 
however, it is likely that the court simply did not anticipate discovery of
misconduct prior to deliberations in making this statement. See also State v. 
Durfee, 322 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Minn. 1982) (“A party who learns of a misconduct 
of a juror during trial may not keep silent and then attempt to take advantage of it 
in the event of an adverse verdict.”).
69. 578 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002).
70. Id. at 716 (emphasis added).
71. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001).
10
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trial proceedings raises serious questions of possible
prejudice, the court may on its initiative and shall on 
motion of either party question each juror, out of the 
presence of the others, about his exposure to that
material.  The examination shall take place in the
presence of counsel, and a verbatim record of the
examination shall be kept.72
But unlike Rule 26.03, subdivision 19(6), which originated 
from case law, Rule 26.03, subdivision 9 originated from the
American Bar Association Standards regarding Fair Trial and Free 
Press.73  Rule 26.03, subdivision 9 is actually just the last paragraph 
of American Bar Association Standards For Criminal Justice 8-3.6,
which is a six-paragraph standard relating primarily to jury
exposure to pretrial publicity.74  As noted in the comments to the 
ABA standard, its original purpose was to address the tension 
inherent in the Sixth Amendment’s dichotomy between the
people’s right to a public trial and the defendant’s right to a fair 
trial.75  This relationship, however, is obscured in Minnesota’s Rules 
of Criminal Procedure.  In promulgating the Rules, the court chose 
only to adopt paragraph (e), which relates to admonishing the jury 
not to pay attention to the media in any case in which there 
appears to be significant public interest, and paragraph (f), which
governs investigating possible exposure to media content.76
Though the full ABA standard was not adopted, the two paragraphs 
that were adopted were placed side-by-side as subdivisions 8 and 9
of Rule 26.03.  Additionally, the sources of subdivisions 8 and 9 
were referenced in the comments to the Rules.77  Thus, the 
72. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 (1976).  The Rule has been amended 
only once, to update the language so that it is gender neutral. MINN. R. CRIM. P.
26.03, subd. 9 (effective January 1, 1990).
73. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 cmt. (adopting AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, 3.5(f) (Approved Draft,
1968)).  A subsequent edition of the standards renumbered standard 3.5 as 8-3.6.
See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.6 cmt. at 8-51
(1978).  However, paragraph (f) remained unchanged. Id. at 8-57.
74. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.6
cmt. at 8-52 (1978) (“The purpose of the standard is to preserve the integrity of 
the criminal trial process in the setting of a highly publicized case.”).
75. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8.6 cmt. at 
8-31S (Supp. 1986).
76. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 8-3.6(e)
and (f) and cmt. at 8-56 and 57 (1978) (stating the purpose of paragraph (e) has 
not changed since the first edition, and stating that paragraph (f) is unchanged
from the first edition).
77. See MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 8 cmt. (adopting the substance of 
11
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placement and source references indicate that subdivisions 8 and 9 
were originally intended to apply to pretrial publicity.  However, 
two circumstances have led to a broader application.
First, though subdivision 8 clearly refers to publicity about the 
case,78 subdivision 9 simply refers to “material disseminated outside 
the trial proceedings.”79  Thus, the plain meaning of the language 
in subdivision 9 could conceivably be interpreted as referring to 
items other than or in addition to publicity.  Second, though the 
comments were written contemporaneously with the Rules, the 
comments were not printed in the official state publication of the 
Rules until 1988, about thirteen years after the Rules were first 
promulgated.80 Thus, many members of the bench and bar may 
have had no guidance regarding the origin or intended
interpretation of the Rules, and would not have known that Rule 
26.03, subdivision 9 originated as a pretrial publicity rule.
Since its promulgation, Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure
26.03, subdivision 9 has been examined at the appellate level in 
only eleven cases, excluding State v. Greer.81  However, only State v. 
Denny,82 an unpublished opinion by the court of appeals, discussed 
the Rule in the context of trial publicity.83  Each of the other cases 
involved some other source alleged to have prejudiced the jury, 
which typically occurred during the course of the trial.84  Although 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 8-3.6(a) (1985));
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 cmt. (adopting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
STANDARDS, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, 3.5(f) (Approved Draft, 1968)).
78. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 8 (directing that jurors not read, listen to, 
or watch media reports about the case).
79. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9.
80. See MINN. R. CRIM. P., as printed in the Court Rules volume of the 
Minnesota Statutes (1988).  Though the Rules of Criminal Procedure were printed 
in the Court Rules or final volume of the Minnesota Statutes in each publication 
between 1976 and 1988, the comments were not printed with the Rules until 1988.
The comments were, however, printed with the Rules in Minnesota Reports when 
they were first promulgated. See MINN. R. CRIM. P., as printed in Minnesota
Reports, vol. 299 (1975) (special section following page 253).
81. See infra notes 84-85.
82. No. C4-94-478, 1994 WL 615115 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1994).
83. See id. (discussing the procedure followed when two front-page articles 
were printed the morning after the parties rested their cases).
84. State v. Wilford, 408 N.W.2d 577, 581 (Minn. 1987) (referring to MINN. R. 
CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 as the proper procedure to address the effect of a 
conversation jurors overhead while on the elevator); State v. Cox, 322 N.W.2d 555, 
560 (Minn. 1982) (upholding the trial court’s denial of a mistrial where the court 
promptly held a hearing pursuant to MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9  to gauge the 
possibility that a remark made by the sheriff would affect the verdict); State v. 
Varner, No. C4-00-801, 2001 WL 506973 (Minn. Ct. App. May 15, 2001) (utilizing 
12
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the cases can generally be characterized by the occurrence of 
misconduct prior to the jury’s deliberations, a few mention the 
Schwartz procedure and attempt to combine the two rules.85 In 
contrast, where the ABA standard underlying Minnesota Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9 has been adopted or 
applied in other jurisdictions, it has almost always been exclusively 
applied to cases involving pre- or mid-trial publicity.86 Thus, it 
Schwartz hearing case law (citing State v. Landro, 504 N.W.2d 741 (Minn. 1993)) to 
analyze defendant’s appeal based on improper denial of a hearing pursuant to 
MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9), rev’d, 643 N.W.2d 298, 305 (Minn. 2002) (stating 
that MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 required the trial court to question jurors to 
determine the prejudicial effect of a racial comment made by a member of the 
panel) (emphasis added); State v. LeRoy, 594 N.W.2d 193, 194-95 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1999) (stating that there should have been an inquiry pursuant to MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 26.03, subd. 9 to determine the prejudicial effect of a complaint accidentally 
sent in with the jury); State v. Willette, C1-98-477, 1999 WL 10243 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Jan. 12, 1999) (distinguishing between independent voir dire (MINN. R. CRIM. P. 
26.03, subd. 9) and a Schwartz hearing (MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 19(6)) in 
analyzing alleged improper contact between a bailiff and the jury); State v. 
McMahan, No. C6-96-986, 1997 WL 76319 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 25, 1997) (finding 
no abuse of discretion in denying a mistrial motion where the defendant did not 
move the trial court to question the jurors following allegations that they may have 
seen a police officer holding an assault weapon in the hall outside the courtroom 
before the trial began); State v. Pischke, No. C1-94-941, 1994 WL 637762 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Nov. 15, 1994) (analyzing whether a Schwartz hearing should have been 
held pursuant to MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 after counsel erroneously 
contacted a juror by phone during deliberations); State v. Parker, 412 N.W.2d 419, 
422 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that counsel should have requested a Schwartz
hearing pursuant to MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 after discovering that an 
injured pedestrian had mingled with the jury during a break), rev’d on other 
grounds, 417 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1988); State v. McBroom, 394 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 
Ct. App. 1986) (upholding denial of Schwartz hearing where juror simply saw, but 
did not come in contact with, a witness outside of the trial).
85. See State v. Pischke, No. C1-94-941, 1994 WL 637762, at *2 (Minn. Ct. 
App. Nov. 15, 1994); State v. Parker, 412 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); 
State v. McBroom, 394 N.W.2d 806, 812 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
86. See, e.g., U.S. v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1987); U.S. v. Manzella, 
782 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1986); U.S. v. Herring, 568 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1978); U.S. 
v. Lord, 565 F.2d 831 (2d Cir. 1977); U.S. v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459 (7th Cir. 1977); 
Booton v. Hanauer, 541 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Alessio, 528 F. 2d 1079 
(9th Cir. 1976); U.S. v. Concepcion Cueto, 515 F.2d 160 (1st Cir. 1975); U.S. v. 
Hyde, 448 F.2d 815 (5th Cir. 1971); U.S. v. Solomon, 422 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 
1970); Hanscomb v. Meachum, 435 F. Supp. 1162 (D. Mass. 1977); U.S. v.
Titsworth, 422 F.Supp. 587 (D. Neb. 1976); Brown v. State, 601 P.2d 221 (Alaska 
1979); Harper v. Colorado, 817 P.2d 77 (Colo. 1991); Calaway v. U.S., 408 A.2d 
1220 (D.C. 1979); Salas v. State, 544 So.2d 1040 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. 
Keliiholokai, 569 P.2d 891 (Haw. 1977); State v. Jones, 383 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1978); State v. Lykins, 382 N.E.2d 1242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State v. Frank, 298 
N.W.2d 324 (Iowa 1980); State v. Burt, 249 N.W.2d 651 (Iowa 1977);
Commonwealth v. Hanscomb, 328 N.E.2d 880 (Mass. 1975); State v. Rumney, 258 
13
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would appear that through an accident of publishing, Minnesota 
Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9 has never been
construed to apply merely to pretrial publicity, as was most likely 
originally intended.
3. Reconciling Greer with History
The Schwartz procedure has been utilized on innumerable 
occasions since it was first established in case law and then
promulgated as Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03,
subdivision 19(6).  As discussed above, use of the Schwartz hearing
has expanded over time to include both mid- and post-trial issues.87
In contrast, Rule 26.03, subdivision 9 has been seldom utilized 
since its promulgation.  When subdivision 9 has been utilized, it has 
usually been construed in terms of pre- or mid-trial issues.88  Thus, 
an examination of the two Rules raises the question of whether the 
distinction made in Greer as to when each Rule should be used is 
historically accurate.89  The answer is that the “Schwartz hearing” is a 
term of art describing the procedure by which both rules are carried 
out.  Rather than standing simply for a procedure to ferret out 
allegations of misconduct discovered after the jury has entered into 
deliberations or has rendered a verdict, the term now stands for a 
pre- or post-verdict procedure in which:
(1) counsel is required to bring allegations of
misconduct or source of prejudicial effect to the trial 
court’s attention as soon as such suspicion arises;
(2) the trial court considers whether the allegations
A.2d 349 (N.H. 1969); State v. Harris, 716 A.2d 485 (N.J. 1998); State v. Bey, 548 
A.2d 846 (N.J. 1988); State v. Reedy, 324 A.2d 607 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1974); 
State v. Voeller, 356 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1984); Commonwealth v. Beasley, 479 A.2d 
460 (Pa. 1984); Commonwealth v. Bruno, 352 A.2d 40 (Pa. 1976); Commonwealth 
v. Reeves, 387 A.2d 877 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 247 
S.E.2d 707 (Va. 1978); State v. Howe, 87 Wash. App. 1067 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997); 
State v. Mims, 511 P.2d 1383 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973); State v. Clay, 501 P.2d 603 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1972); Drollinger v. State, 284 N.W.2d 122 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).
But see U.S. v. Spinella, 506 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1975) (regarding the effect of 
telephone calls made to jurors during trial); State v. Finley, 355 S.E.2d 47 (Va. 
1987) (regarding possible prejudice from a juror who served on a jury that tried 
the defendant on a different indictment).
87. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
88. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
89. See State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001) (stating MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 26.03, subd. 19(6) should be used if the defendant learns of misconduct during 
deliberations or after the verdict, and MINN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 9 should be 
used if the defendant learns of the misconduct during the trial proceeding itself).
14
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indicate prejudice which could influence or may have 
influenced the verdict; and
(3) if a hearing is granted, jurors are questioned by the 
trial court on the record.90
Thus, the Schwartz hearing is just that: the hearing conducted
pursuant to either Rule 26.03, subdivision 9 or subdivision 19(6).
In State v. Greer, the court differentiated between the timing of the 
two rules, stating that subdivision 9 applied to exposure learned of 
during the trial and subdivision 19(6) applied to exposure learned 
of during deliberations or after the verdict is reached.91  As detailed 
above, this distinction is not supported by the relevant case law.
However, if the Schwartz hearing can be understood to refer to the 
hearing that is held in conjunction with both rules rather than 
simply subdivision 19(6), then the distinction in Greer is a good 
one.  The distinction would make clear that parties may assert 
misconduct or prejudicial exposure at any stage of trial.  Yet 
reference to the Schwartz hearing in conjunction with both rules 
would not limit the case law available to support arguments about 
such issues as how liberally the hearing should be granted,92 what 
type of showing must be made,93 or whether the jurors must be 
questioned separately or as a panel.94  Fortunately, the Greer
90. It should be noted that the type of questions that are permissible at pre-
and post-verdict hearings do differ.  Prior to deliberations, the trial court may ask 
whether the outside influence will affect the juror’s ability to render a fair and 
impartial verdict.  State v. Cox, 322 N.W.2d 555, 559 n.1 (Minn. 1982) (stating 
Rule 606(b) does not prohibit the trial court from asking about the “likely effect 
of a prejudicial statement on the subsequent deliberations”).  But after the verdict,
the trial court may not inquire as to the jurors’ thought processes. See State v. 
Martin, 614 N.W.2d 214, 226 (Minn. 2000) (upholding the trial court’s denial of a 
Schwartz hearing where the defendant alleged that sympathy controlled the jury’s 
decision because the rules of evidence forbid testimony about thought processes 
in determining guilt). See also MINN. R. EVID. 606(b). But see State v. Callender, 
297 N.W.2d 744, 746 (Minn. 1980) (excepting inquiry into racial bias stating, “the 
rule should not be interpreted as completely foreclosing inquiry into jury
deliberations even in cases in which there is strong evidence that racial prejudice 
infected the jury’s verdict”).
91. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 93.
92. See, e.g., Olberg v. Minneapolis Gas Co., 291 Minn. 334, 343, 191 N.W.2d 
418, 424 (1971) (“The trial courts . . . should be liberal in granting a hearing.”).
93. See, e.g., State v. Larson, 281 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Minn. 1979) (“To establish 
a prima facie case, a defendant must submit sufficient evidence which, standing 
alone and unchallenged, would warrant the conclusion of jury misconduct.”).
94. See, e.g., Quinn v. Winkel’s, Inc., 279 N.W.2d 65, 69 (Minn. 1979) (finding 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to hold a full Schwartz
hearing when answers to questions directed at the jury as a whole indicated that 
none had been contacted about the trial).
15
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opinion can be read in this manner because the court’s reference 
to the Schwartz hearing appears prior to the discussion as to when 
each Rule must be applied.  If that was the court’s intent, it marks a 
substantial step forward in clarifying the applicability and scope of 
the now forty-year-old procedure codified in Minnesota Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 19(6) and the seldom-
utilized procedure in Minnesota Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.03, 
subdivision 9.
B. A Question of Propriety
After discussing the procedure Greer should have followed in 
raising the issue of outside influence upon the jury, the court next 
turned to the propriety of the trial judge deciding the motion for a 
new trial and a Schwartz hearing when his own conduct was at issue.
The court expressed grave concern:
Our more serious concern is that when counsel did, in the 
context of a motion for a Schwartz hearing, raise the jury 
contact issue, the motion was decided by the same trial 
court judge alleged to have engaged in improper conduct.
When a judge presides over a motion hearing to decide 
whether further inquiry is required into the propriety of 
the judge’s own conduct, it raises questions about the
impartiality of the court’s decision.  Because public trust 
and confidence in the judiciary depend on the integrity of 
the judicial decision-making process, we can ill afford to 
ignore this problem.  We stress that nothing in the albeit 
sparse record indicates that the trial court’s consideration 
of Greer’s motion was not impartial.  However, the mere 
appearance of partiality warrants concern.95
The court then remanded the case to the Chief Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District for a Schwartz hearing regarding the trial 
court’s ex parte contacts with the jury.96  This action represented a 
positive policy shift, recognizing that a trial judge should never be 
placed in the position of evaluating his own credibility or the effect 
of his own conduct on the jury.
Though the law in Minnesota is well established as to the 
95. Greer, 635 N.W.2d at 93-94 (emphasis added).
96. Id. at 94.  On remand, the Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial District 
conducted a Schwartz hearing of six randomly selected jurors and found that the 
jury’s verdict was not the product of misconduct by the trial court. State v. Greer,
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, Dist. Ct. File No. 98103242 (May 
24, 2002).
16
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impropriety of a trial judge communicating or coming into contact 
with a jury after it has entered into deliberations,97 there is virtually 
no case law regarding the propriety of the trial judge
communicating with or coming into contact with the jury before
deliberations.98
The first case to discuss the utilization of a Schwartz hearing to 
address the possible effect on a jury of the trial judge’s conduct was 
Zimmerman v. Witte Transportation Co.99 In that case, two jurors 
contacted the judge to express their belief that they had rendered a 
verdict in favor of  Zimmerman, but had learned from a newspaper 
article that Witte Transportation had prevailed.100 The trial judge 
questioned the jurors, off-the-record and without notifying counsel, 
and determined that the jurors did not feel the truck driver from 
the Witte Transportation Co. was negligent.101 Since this comported
with the verdict rendered, the trial judge did not feel the need to 
disturb the verdict or to discuss the issue with counsel.102  When 
Zimmerman’s counsel learned of the trial judge’s contact with 
members of the jury from other sources, he made a motion for a 
Schwartz hearing, which was denied by the trial court as follows:
It appears that at least two of the jurors thought that the 
verdict they agreed to would entitle plaintiffs to recover.
Each of these jurors came to the Court the next day and 
so stated. Upon questioning, however, both were adamant 
that in their opinion the defendant’s driver was not 
negligent.  By virtue of the foregoing plaintiffs now seek a 
hearing pursuant to [Schwartz].  It does not appear to the 
Court that that is a case where such a hearing would be 
appropriate. Schwartz (ibid) involved a case where there 
was alleged misconduct on the part of a juror.  In that 
case the Supreme Court said there should be a hearing on 
that kind of question before the trial judge.  In the case at 
bar, plaintiffs’ claim that a Schwartz hearing should be 
97. See MINN. STAT. § 631.09 (2000) (providing that “[n]o person may be 
permitted to speak or communicate with any juror, unless by order of the court”).
See also State v. Mims, 306 Minn. 159, 165, 235 N.W.2d 381, 386 (1975) (finding 
reversible error where the judge entered the jury room during deliberations).
98. See, e.g., State v. McGath, 370 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Minn. 1985) (finding the 
trial judge’s on-the-record interview of a juror for possible bias did not deny 
defendant’s right to trial by an impartial jury even though neither the defendant 
nor his counsel was present during the questioning).
99. 259 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1977).
100. Id. at 262.
101. Id. at 263.
102. Id.
17
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had because the jury was confused and misunderstood the 
effect of the verdict. That is not a ground for a Schwartz 
hearing.103
In reviewing the issue on appeal, the supreme court
recognized that, ideally, the conversations between the trial judge 
and the troubled jurors would have been on the record.104
However, because the trial court was “unequivocal in his
recollection of the statements made to him by the jurors,” the court 
found it had not committed error in denying the Schwartz
hearing.105 Further, the court distinguished Zimmerman from the 
case of Ramfjord v. Sullivan,106 in which the court had ordered a new 
trial because the trial judge’s recollection of off-the-record
conversations that had taken place with the jurors when they 
returned the verdict was “a little hazy as to just what took place.”107
In the next case to address the issue, Gersdorf v. G.M. Stewart 
Lumber Co.,108 the trial judge provided a written response to a 
question submitted by the jury during deliberations without
informing the parties’ counsel and without a court reporter
present.109 In that case, however, the supreme court made a clear 
connection between the Schwartz hearing and inquiry into the trial 
court’s own conduct by stating, “[w]e have also held that where the 
trial judge is unequivocal in his recollection of the facts concerning 
prejudicial conduct, a Schwartz hearing is unnecessary.”110 The 
supreme court then remanded the case to the trial court for a 
determination as to its recollection, stating, “[i]f the trial judge 
unequivocally recollects giving the alleged secret instruction, then a 
new trial must be granted.  In the alternative, if the trial judge is 
unsure of the incident, then this is remanded with an order for the 
trial judge to conduct a Schwartz hearing.”111  Thus, unlike Greer, in 
which the case was remanded to a judge other than the judge whose 
conduct was at issue, in Gersdorf, the court remanded the issue to 
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 263-64.
106. 301 Minn. 238, 222 N.W.2d 541 (1974).  It should be noted that whether 
to grant a Schwartz hearing was never at issue in Ramfjord.  Rather, the case 
concerned conversations between the judge and jury when the jury returned a 
comparative negligence verdict that seemed to contain a mathematical error. Id.
107. Zimmerman, 259 N.W.2d at 264.
108. 316 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1982).
109. Id. at 518.
110. Id. (citing Zimmerman, 259 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 1977)).
111. Id.
18
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the same judge alleged to have engaged in the disputed conduct.
A few years later, Gersdorf was cited in the case of State v. Ming 
Sen Shiue112 as an example of case law defining actionable contact 
between the judge and jury.113  In that case, the jury requested that 
they be able to view three videotapes entered into evidence.114
“The trial judge granted the request after conducting the jury to 
the courtroom and notifying counsel.”115  However, after viewing 
just one of the tapes, the jury communicated to the judge that they 
were possibly a hung jury.116  The judge suggested that the jury view 
the remaining two tapes as they had originally requested, but after
doing so, the jury indicated that they were still hung.117  Defense 
counsel objected to the judge’s ex parte contact with the jury in 
which he suggested the review of additional evidence and moved 
for a mistrial, which was denied.118  Stating simply that “[t]he
court’s recollection of the incident was uncontroverted,” the
supreme court found that the contact was “not of the type that 
requires application of legal standards concerning communication 
between a judge and jury outside the presence of counsel and off
the record.”119
Three years later, in State v. Jurek,120 the Minnesota Supreme 
Court addressed the utilization of a Schwartz hearing to address the 
trial court’s recollection of a third party’s conduct as well as his 
own. In that case, when the jury asked the bailiff if certain 
testimony could be reread, the bailiff instructed the jury to “abide 
by their own recollection of the evidence and the judge’s
instructions.”121  When the appellant informed the court of the 
bailiff’s remark, the trial court “acknowledged the existence of a 
communication but believed it to be centered on a juror’s lost 
ring.”122  Then, in attempting to determine whether the jury had 
been affected by the bailiff’s comment, the judge stated, “[w]hat 
the bailiff told you, to rely on your own recollection.  Frankly that’s 
what I would have told you so I don’t see anything harmful about it, 
112. 326 N.W.2d 648 (Minn. 1982).






119. Id. at 653-54 (citing Gersdorf, 316 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1982)).
120. 376 N.W.2d 233 (Minn. 1985).
121. Id. at 235.
122. Id. at 237.
19
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but I just thought I would ask.”123  In deciding the issue on appeal, 
the supreme court distinguished Jurek from those cases in which a 
Schwartz hearing was found to be unnecessary because in Jurek the 
trial judge was not unequivocal in his recollection of the facts 
concerning the prejudicial conduct.124
Finally, the connection between a Schwartz hearing and the 
judge’s conduct was most recently discussed in State v. Kelley.125  In 
that case, the jury contacted the trial judge in writing several times 
to say that it was doubtful they would be able to reach a unanimous 
decision.126  In each case, the note was read to the judge over the 
phone, and in each case the judge, without consulting or notifying 
counsel, or making a record of the communication, instructed the 
clerk to inform the jury to keep working.127  Eventually, the jury 
returned a unanimous verdict; however, shortly afterward, a juror 
informed the trial judge that another juror had threatened him 
with physical violence.128  The trial court held a Schwartz hearing to 
investigate the allegation, but ultimately found that no misconduct 
had occurred.129  However, the trial court’s ruling did not address 
its own conduct, and it was on that basis that the appellant made his 
appeal.130  In deciding the case, the supreme court continued its 
distinction between the types of contacts between the judge and 
jury that might necessitate a new trial, this time citing American 
Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice 15-3.7(b), which 
states that “[t]he trial judge . . . should not communicate with a 
juror or the jury on any aspect of the case itself (as distinguished 
from matters relating to physical comforts and the like), except
after notice to all parties and reasonable opportunity for them to 
be present.”131  Ironically, this slight reference to the ABA standard 
became the basis for the court’s statement in Greer that it had 
previously distinguished between “communications relating to
aspects of a pending case from nonsubstantive contacts and mere 
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. 
1977)).
125. 517 N.W.2d 905 (Minn. 1994).
126. Id. at 907-08.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 908.
129. Id.
130. Appellant argued that he was entitled to a new trial because the court’s ex
parte contacts with the jury coerced the jury to convict. Id.
131. Id.
20
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pleasantries.”132  However, the Kelley opinion had no effect on the 
propriety of holding a Schwartz hearing based upon the strength of 
the trial judge’s recollection because in Kelley, a second error 
coupled with the trial court’s contacts required reversal.133  Thus, 
leading into Greer, the Minnesota Supreme Court had not yet 
commented as to the propriety of a judge presiding over a hearing 
at which his or her own conduct was at issue.  Rather, the court still 
relied heavily on the trial court’s discretion in granting the Schwartz
hearing, 134 even in that circumstance.
As in Minnesota, the question as to whether a judge should 
preside over a hearing in which his or her own conduct is at issue 
has arisen infrequently in other jurisdictions.  In Tyler v. Swenson,135
the Eighth Circuit considered the effect of the trial court judge 
presiding over a post-conviction hearing to address the
voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea when the defendant
asserted that the trial judge coerced him into making the plea.136
In that case, the trial judge interjected his own recollection of 
events throughout the post-conviction hearing, and even entered 
into a dispute with the defendant’s counsel, which was so heated
that counsel was eventually held in contempt.137  The circuit court 
found that the defendant had been denied a full, fair, and
adequate hearing because he had no opportunity to cross-examine
the judge as to his recollections, or to have the hearing held before 
another judge.138  The court explained that although a trial judge 
should not be disqualified from hearing every post-conviction
hearing simply because he or she is familiar with the proceedings, 
where, as in Tyler, the judge’s recollection is the only testimony that 
can refute the defendant’s claim, the judge should not preside over 
the hearing.139
However, a Texas case interpreting Tyler came to a different 
conclusion. George v. Texas140 also involved a situation where the 
trial judge presided over the post-conviction hearing following 
132. State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 n.3 (Minn. 2001).
133. State v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905, 910-11 (Minn. 1994).
134. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Witte Transp. Co., 259 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 
1977) (“The granting of a Schwartz hearing is generally a matter of discretion for 
the trial court.”).
135. 427 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1970).
136. Id. at 414-15.
137. Id. at 414.
138. Id. at 415.
139. Id. at 417.
140. 20 S.W.3d 130 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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allegations that the trial judge coerced the defendant’s plea.141
Additionally, the trial judge made a lengthy statement on the 
record “in which she relied upon her recollection of the events 
preceding appellant’s plea to refute much of the testimony of his 
trial counsel.”142  In deciding the issue, the court of appeals
disagreed with Tyler, stating, “we believe Tyler is mistaken in 
suggesting that a judge’s unarticulated recollection of events or 
proceedings from the trial can rightly be characterized as
‘testimony’ or that the memory of such events transforms the judge 
into a ‘witness.’”143  Therefore, the court found that “[u]nless the 
trial judge is disqualified or has been recused, it is not improper for 
a trial judge to preside over a hearing on the motion for new trial 
and review the propriety of his or her own rulings,
pronouncements or conduct.”144  This statement is very similar to 
the pronouncement made by the Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District in Greer when denying Greer’s motion for a Schwartz
hearing.145  But in George, the trial judge’s conduct was on the 
record, whereas in Greer, the trial judge’s conversations with the 
jury in the jury room were not on the record.  Thus, Tyler seems to 
present the better rule.
It is clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed a 
desire in its opinions to establish permissible and impermissible 
contact between a judge and jury.  However, the court also seems to 
have expressed an opinion that all contacts, regardless of their 
nature, should be conducted in the presence of counsel and on the 
record.146  Thus, a fair interpretation of these policies seems to be 
that a trial judge should never be in a position to pass judgment on 
his or her own credibility.147  Should the judge be placed in that 
position, the hearing should be heard by another judge so that 
there can be no question about the impartiality of the court’s 
141. Id. at 133.
142. Id. at 139.
143. Id. at 137.
144. Id. at 139.
145. Brief for Appellant at app. 11 (Order, Chief Judge Daniel Mabley, June 4, 
1999) (ordering that the hearing be heard by the trial court judge “unless and 
until he recuses himself or is otherwise removed for cause”).
146. See, e.g., State v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905, 908 (Minn. 1994) (stating that 
contacts between the judge and jury should be in the presence of defendant and 
counsel).
147. See Tyler v. Swenson, 427 F.2d 412, 415 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding the 
record supported petitioner’s contention that the judge in effect passed upon his 
own credibility in making the factual determination).
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decision.148 Greer is the first case to make that explicit.149
III. CONCLUSION
State v. Greer is a significant Minnesota Supreme Court opinion
for two reasons.  First, it clarifies that Minnesota Rule of Criminal
Procedure 26.03, subdivision 9 applies to allegations of misconduct
discovered prior to jury deliberations, while Minnesota Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 26.03, subdivision 19(6) applies to allegations 
of misconduct discovered after the jury has entered deliberations or 
after the verdict has been rendered.  However, both rules may 
arguably result in a Schwartz hearing, which has become a term of 
art rather than a procedure linked only to subdivision 19(6).
Second, if there is a question as to the effect of the trial judge’s own
conduct on the verdict, a Schwartz hearing should be conducted by 
a different judge so there can be no question as to the impartiality of 
the court’s decision.  Each clarification marks a subtle but positive 
shift in policy.  And in turn, each policy change ensures the 
defendant’s rights to an impartial jury and an impartial judge.
148. See State v. Greer, 635 N.W.2d 82, 93 (Minn. 2001).
149. It is not clear, however, which procedure a litigant should use to gain a 
hearing before another judge.  In this case, Greer attempted to gain a hearing
before the Chief Judge of the Fourth Judicial District by filing both a motion for a 
new trial and a motion for recusal. Brief for Appellant at 2, State v. Greer, 635 
N.W.2d 82 (Minn. 2001) (Nos. C9-99-1550, C7-00-2154).  The supreme court did 
not indicate in its opinion whether either method should have succeeded.
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